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ABSTRACT 
 
Biometric national identity card schemes are increasingly becoming common around the world 
and considered as an essential social component of our time. It is assumed that providing national 
identity cards to all the citizens will help governments to combat various social malice such as 
terrorism, illegal immigration, fraudulent activities, and accelerate social service delivery. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of national identity card has been a matter of academic and policy 
debate. This paper, based on a review of the literature, portrays a general overview and the 
current state of knowledge and understanding about the issues and concerns associated with 
national identity schemes. Although the use of biometric technology-based national identity 
schemes need not or do not face refusals, the unintended, unwelcome and unanticipated 
consequences on society of such a high-tech scheme must be critically considered to ensure utmost 
benefits to the society. It is also suggested that in order to combat or control social threats and 
vices, social resistance is more important than the introduction and use of high technology. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the influx global migration, 
tremendous threat of terrorism, crime and fraud, 
and the demand for modernisation of public 
services, many governments around the world 
are nearly unanimous in their silver bullet: 
identity policy (Whitley & Hosein, 2010). The 
basic function of a national identity system is to 
link a stream of data with a person (Clarke, 
1994). Identification is defined as the act of 
identifying, the state of being identified or 
something that identifies one (Clarke, 1994). 
The verb identify is linked to the noun identity, 
such as in the case of the term identity card 
which can be used to identify someone 
belonging to a particular group (Micheal & 
Micheal, 2006).  
 
When a governmental identification system 
exists, then an official identity is produced 
which can then be reproduced in subsequent 
identification processes. The state makes use of 
instruments for compulsory registration and 
identification for each one of its citizens in 
order to establish such an identity (Hornung & 
Roßnagel, 2010). Issuing National Identity (ID) 
cards to the citizens is a measure of such 
identification. Modern bureaucracy demands 
that all individuals of a particular society may 
are identified in such a manner so that they are 
entitled to call themselves citizens. Without 
identification, one cannot perform the 
responsibilities of citizenship such as voting, 
nor enjoy the benefits, such as protection 
against external or internal threats to well-being 
(Lyon, 2009). As a matter of fact, the 
introduction of National IDs has  made a 
difference to the lives of the citizens across the 
countries, and it will continue to make a bigger 
imprint on their lives in future (Islam, 
Baniamin, &Rajib, 2012). At this backdrop, this 
review captures the arguments that are in favour 
of introducing biometric national identity cards 
in one side and highlights the controversies 
surrounding the issue on the other side. Finally, 
it identifies some specific risks and pitfalls 
associated with national identity card schemes.         
 
 
2. BACKGROUND  
 
Governments across the world are rushing to 
implement national identity systems. The aims 
of these systems vary widely, but the many 
proposals involve a push to create ‗perfect 
identity‘ that will fuse the biometric details of 
every person with vast central databases 
containing personal information (Davies, 2005). 
It is said that biometrics, which is literally the 
‗measurement of life‘ refers to the technology 
of measuring, analysing and processing the 
digital representations of unique biological data 
and behavioural traits such as fingerprints, eye 
retinas, irises, facial patterns, hand geometry 
and body odours. It can be used for 
identification purposes of the individuals 
(Mordini & Petrini, 2007).  
 
Around the world, biometric technologies are 
on the rise enforcing an integration of 
biometrics into the lives of citizens. Such 
technologies often leave citizens with no choice 
but to accept biometrics (Krupp, Rathgeb & 
Busch, 2013). There are some specific reasons 
that make biometric-based identity cards or 
smart cards a topic of great interest which 
include: i) more countries are starting to use 
them; ii) there is strong pressure to include 
biometric data for anti-terrorism and police 
purposes; and ii) the time now has come when 
the capabilities of electronic chips relating to 
electronic identity are ready to be used such as; 
electronic authentication and signature 
(Combet, 2004). After the 9/11 event, the issue 
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of issuance of national identity card has largely 
been staged on the global platform, and several 
countries such as the USA, the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece and some 
Eastern European countries began to consider 
adopting smart national ID cards (Kitiyadisai, 
2004). Very specifically, dangers associated 
with the social security problem like terrorism, 
illegal immigrations and unworthy claimants of 
public benefits have encouraged the 
governments around the world to impose ID 
cards of their citizens (Rule, 2005).  
 
In the UK, the bio-metric based national 
identity card was introduced after the enactment 
of ‗Identity Cards Bill‘ for the purposes of the 
interests of national security; the prevention or 
detection of crime; the enforcement of 
immigration controls; the enforcement of 
prohibitions on unauthorised working or 
employment; and for securing the efficient and 
effective provision of public services (House of 
Commons, 2005). Belgium is one of the first 
countries in the world to implement electronic 
identity card scheme on a national scale with an 
aim to providing citizens a secured identity 
document, and also a brand-new digital 
signature and identification tool for faster and 
secure access to public and private services 
online (Gemalto, 2011). The Estonian ID card 
roll-out is known to be the most successful in 
Europe. It has been organised in public-private 
partnership and many applications are working 
with it such as; e-ticketing, drivers permit 
verification, health insurance, banking and 
digital signature and checking of bills 
(European Commission, 2006). Some Asian 
countries such as; the Philippines, Japan, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, have also made 
concrete attempts establishing an electronic 
smart ID card policy. For instance; the unrest in 
the south of Thailand and the increasing threat 
of terrorism forced Thai government to go with 
a smart ID card scheme as a measure to counter 
terrorism (Kitiyadisai, 2004).  
 
In South Asia, India has introduced the world‘s 
largest biometric-based identity scheme called 
‗Unique Identification‘ (UID) for its 1.2 billion 
people (Jacobsen, 2012). UID aims at giving the 
government a clear view of India‘s population, 
enabling the government to target and deliver 
services effectively, and achieving greater 
returns on social investments, monitor money 
and resource flows across the country (UIDAI, 
2010 cited in Jacobsen, 2012). To fulfil 
ambition to become a Smart Nation, Bangladesh 
launched ID card programme in the nineties. 
Recently, such programme has been spread in a 
massive scale across the country. In 
Bangladesh, the impact of NID cards on the 
daily life of people are growing as the 
government has declared that citizens above 18 
years age must acquire NID cards in order to 
receive 22 specific public and private services  
(Islam, Baniamin, & Rajib, 2012)
1
.  The major 
expected benefit of a National ID System in 
Bangladesh is to assist service agencies in 
public and private sectors to verify the identity 
of the service recipients in a streamlined and 
timely manner (Election Commission, nd).   
                                                          
1
In  2008 Government of Bangladesh specified 
through a gazette notification that NID have to be 
presented in case of 1) Issuance and renewal of a 
passport , 2) Driving license, 3) Trade license, 4) 
Tax identification number (TIN), 5) Bank accounts, 
6) Business identification number, 7) Business bank 
account, 8) Beneficiary‘s owner account (Stock 
Exchanges), 9) Connection of utility services, 10) 
Telephone connection, 11) Mobile phone 
registration, 12) Internet connection, 13) Cable 
television connection, 14) Registration for public 
exams, 15) Marriage registration, 16) Loans, 17) 
Government Subsidies, 18) Government 
Allowances, 19) Buying land, 20) Selling land, 21) 
School admissions and 22) Lodging cases in court. 
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Despite having some concrete arguments in 
favour of launching identity cards at the 
national level, there are many controversies 
against each of the arguments. Some of the 
arguments as such have been stated below. 
Potato (Solanum tuberosum L.) is the world's 
fourth-largest food crop, as it is an important 
staple food in the world after maize, wheat and 
rice (FAOSTAT, 2014). In Sri Lanka also, 
potato is considered as an economically 
important vegetable crop. Bacterial wilt caused 
by R. solanacearum is a major problem 
confronted by the potato farmers in Sri Lanka. It 
was recorded 5% to 25% loss of potato yield in 
Sri Lanka due to bacterial wilt (Kelaniyangoda 
et al, 1995). According to the Plant Protection 
Act No. 35 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1999), R. 
solanacearum is considered as a quarantine pest 
in Sri Lanka, since some of the strains of this 
species have not yet been reported, the existing 
strains also have a restricted distribution 
(Bandara, 1983; Kelaniyangoda, 1995) and the 
disease is officially controlled in the country. 
Introduction of the unavailable strains of R. 
solanacearum into the country may cause major 
outbreaks of diseases not only in potato but also 
in other crops in family Solanaceae and 
Musaceae, causing huge economic losses. 
 
Potato is grown through vegetative propagation 
using potato tubers, which is also known as seed 
potato. Use of healthy seed potatoes is one of 
the most effective means to control bacterial 
wilt disease in potato (Hayward, 1991). Out of 
the annual total seed potato requirement, about 
5% is produced by the Department of 
Agriculture; 55% is fulfilled by farmers‘ 
previous harvest; and the balance of 40% is 
imported by the private sector (Kelaniyangoda 
et al, 2004; Malathy et al, 2005; Nugaliyadde et 
al, 2005). Seed potato consignments imported to 
Sri Lanka are inspected visually for pests and 
diseases at the port of entry. But the visual 
observation does not give a clear idea about the 
level of disease infection correctly. Therefore, 
planting of asymptomatic or latently infected 
tubers could lead to outbreaks of diseases at the 
field. Therefore, quarantine restrictions are 
imposed on import of seed potato, considering 
the danger of introducing certain pests and 
pathogens into the country (De Silva and 
Weerasinghe, 2000; Rajapakse et al, 2006).   
 
The available conventional methods such as 
culture methods, biochemical assays, 
pathogenicity test, and biovar determination test 
are time consuming, labour intensive and not 
sensitive for the detection of R. solanacearum 
in asymptomatic potato tubers (Champoiseau et 
al, 2009; van Elsas et al, 2001; Priou et al, 
2014). Immunodiagnostic methods such as 
enzyme - linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 
kits or commercially available immunestrips are 
used for rapid detection of R. solanacearum, but 
it cannot be used to identify sub-specific strains 
of R. solanacearum including races, biovars and 
phylotypes. Additionally, immunodiagnostic 
methods are not much sensitive to detect R. 
solanacearum in asymptomatic potato tubers 
(Elphinstone et al, 1996; Pradhanang et al, 
2000) and sometimes give false positive results 
(Wullings et al, 1998; Llop et al, 1999). 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-mediated 
DNA-based techniques are rapid, more sensitive 
and specific compared to immunodiagnostic 
methods and can be used for detection of ultra-
low population of R. solanacearum in 
asymptomatic or latently infected potato tubers. 
Sensitivity has been reached to 10
2
 - 10
1
 cfu/mL 
(Llop et al, 1999; Ozakman and Schaad, 2003). 
The higher sensitivity of the PCR detection may 
be due to the amplification of living and dead 
cells or cells at viable – but – not - culturable 
(VBNC) state (Josephson et al, 1993).  
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3. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
A comprehensive data collection has been 
conducted from wide range of literature 
published by various authors. Collected data 
made concise to analyse social opportunities 
and threats.  
 
4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
National identity cards of all sorts are 
controversial. The implementation of ID cards 
has raised resistance and objections in various 
countries (Kitiyadisai, 2004). Many of the 
arguments articulated in relation to national ID 
card schemes involve claims regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of large-scale 
databases, connecting multiple databases and 
incorporating millions of people (Neyland, 
2009). While the governments have drawn 
together a justificatory schema involving press 
releases, reports and claims for support from a 
variety of groups all designed to position the ID 
card as reasonable, feasible and necessary, anti-
ID card groups have drawn together a similar 
coalition in opposition (Neyland, 2009). In the 
USA, the UK, Canada and Australia the 
proposals for introducing national ID cards and 
registry systems had raised serious debate with 
regard to control and privacy issues (Fussell, 
2004). Interestingly, many ID proposals around 
the world are running aground because they 
have failed to win the trust of citizens. In their 
haste to implement powerful new identification 
and tracking technologies, governments are 
quickly discovering that civil liberties and 
privacy campaigners are finding a new and 
popular voice (Davies, 2005). Specifically, 
opposition to ID cards and their technical 
infrastructure typically emerges on both 
practical and principled levels. On a practical 
level, security, cost, efficiency, and 
effectiveness inform arguments against a card-
based identity system. The stated benefits of 
these cards are actually misleading. Critiques 
based on principle draw upon a civil liberties 
frame, highlighting how card-based identity 
systems facilitate increased state surveillance 
and act as a breach to constitutional or moral 
dignities by penetrating into the realm of civil 
liberty (Milberry,& Parsons, 2013). 
 
There are many less-than-obvious risks and 
pitfalls concerning the use and misuse of 
national identity cards, and also some genuine 
problems with biometric registrations. For 
example; the assessment of London School of 
Economics, UK warns that biometric 
registration may have to be repeated every five 
years for much of the population. As people 
become aged, their biometrics change and 
become less reliable, and as a result of that, 
these people tend to face problems with the use 
of their cards. Hence, continuous updating of 
biometric information is needed (LSE, 2005).  
 
Some other discrete problems can appear out of 
biometric-based smart card technology system 
such as; i) the recordability of fingerprints can 
be temporarily limited by injuries to fingertips 
or broken fingers and through dirty fingertips. A 
permanent loss of a fingerprint template could 
occur as a result of fingertips being burned or 
scarred. Intensive manual work or working with 
toxic agents can also destroy the fingerprint 
template; ii) the recordability of the face can be 
temporarily lost after major facial surgery; and 
iii) the recordability of the iris template can be 
temporarily impaired d to the dilation of the iris 
as a consequence of the taking of certain 
medicines. Permanent losses of recordability 
may occur as a consequence of eye diseases 
e.g., blindness, cataracts or glaucoma. In 
addition, enrolment is often made more difficult 
by drooping or narrow eyelids, which partially 
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cover the iris (Petermann, Sauter, &Scherz, 
2007). These problems might result in a person 
not being enrolled in an identity system and also 
in denial of access to services-potentially 
disastrous for the individual concerned (Davies, 
2006).  
 
Probably the vulnerability with the greatest 
threat to smart ID card schemes is human error. 
This is amply illustrated by the chaotic handling 
of all kinds of personal and sensitive data by 
various government agencies. For example, 
such problem has been badly proved by the 
mishandling performance of the UK 
Government agencies. Human error can take 
place at any stage where humans interact with 
the scheme. During the enrolment processing, 
data can be incorrectly entered leading to 
confusion once the identity card has been 
issued. Likewise, during enrolment, biometrics 
can be poorly captured leading to a higher level 
of false rejects (Arora, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, the implementation of smart 
national identity cards needs a huge financial 
involvement. For example; in the case of UK, 
LSE‘s (2005) report estimates between 10.6 
billion pound and 19.2 billion pounds for a ten 
year rolling excluding public and private sector 
integration costs and possible overrun costs. 
The report further estimates that costs are also 
to be incurred for imparting training to the staff, 
establishing new facilities, buying expensive 
biometric equipment and updating biometric 
information. In this regard, NO2ID (nd) 
estimates that additional tax burden of setting 
up the scheme in the UK is around 200 pound. 
So, there remains a question whether citizens 
are ready to accept such additional cost in the 
form of increased tax. Besides, the 
consequences of losing one‘s card could 
potentially be a more serious problem and it can 
negatively affect virtually every aspect in a 
person‘s daily routine (Smith, 2008), and such 
loss may be financially very disastrous. 
 
In regard to personal liberty civil rights groups 
say that smart ID cards could easily violate 
personal privacy and deprive one of one‘s 
liberties. They are especially more concerned 
about corrupt or unauthorised government 
officials who could use personal data to 
manipulate and control people (The Nation, 18 
April 2004, cited in Kitiyadisai, 2004). In 
reality, ID cards pose many risks to personal 
liberty which include: i) risks from the legal use 
of accurate information; ii) risk of reliance on 
false information; iii) risk of intentional creation 
of false information; iv) risks from illegal use of 
accurate information; v) risk of over-
dependence on some feature of the system 
(Froomkin, 2008).  
 
Smart identity card scheme invites social, 
economic and digital divides in society 
(Kitiyadisai, 2004), and it might lead to the 
formation of an unhealthy social system and can 
act as a breach of human rights. In the context 
of Thailand, Kitiyadisai (2004) notes that the 
smart ID cards would put marginalised and 
minority groups such as; hill tribe people, 
immigrant workers, illegal foreign workers, 
homeless people, refugees, and illiterate citizens 
at the other end of the social spectrum, making 
it harder for them to have access to social 
services and creating more difficulties in 
proving their entitlements and identities. 
 
One of the strong arguments for many countries 
for going with smart identity card scheme is to 
shield against identity fraud. In fact, service 
providers need to ascertain one‘s identity to 
prevent fraud and harm.  But the belief that 
smart NID cards could provide irrefutable 
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biometric matches without false positives and 
negatives is fallacious. Also, such systems can 
still be cracked, and the criminals and terrorists 
will find ample of ways to exploit them 
(Neumann & Weinstein, 2001). No security on 
any database can be guaranteed, particularly one 
that contains such amount of information which 
are likely to be accessed millions of time every 
day and data that changed on thousands of 
individuals every day. Captivatingly, nominally 
―secure‖, trusted ID is more useful to a fraudster 
(NO2ID, nd). As with any large-scale IT 
implementation risks are omnipresent. National 
ID cards are just as vulnerable to attack as any 
other IT system especially when one considers 
smart ID cards and their respective 
infrastructure as a form of critical national 
infrastructure (Arora, 2008).   
 
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
 
The benefits brought by the National ID system 
are yet to be fully proved and this system is 
inextricably allied with many risks and 
shortcomings. Without considering the probable 
risks and shortcomings, the introduction of 
National Identity Card on a large scale will only 
invite a lot of unintended, unwelcome and 
unanticipated consequences. Policymakers 
should make a careful assessment of those 
consequences, and should not be subjugated to 
the stereotyped notion ―Others are doing, why 
not we‖? Developing countries should seriously 
consider whether they have the luxury to go 
with such an intervention. These countries have 
many important responsibilities to accomplish 
for their citizens other than the mere 
introduction of the national ID card. In 
particular, social vices should be tackled by 
social measures, relying on ID card to tackle 
social vices might not be a very effective 
solution. Technology is often least powerful to 
social forces. At the same time, social 
acceptance/non-acceptance towards biometric 
recognition, benefits and threats must be 
critically assessed before giving high 
importance or obligation to a particular policy 
issue like compulsory biometric scrutiny of the 
citizens for having national identity cards. 
Citizens must be given the right to say either 
‗No‘ or ‗Yes‘ to sharing their personal 
information. The risks of identity fraud are 
common, and any personal damage caused by 
identity fraud cannot be reversed so easily. 
Over-collection of data not only increases the 
risks of leaks but also makes efforts more 
difficult to reverse. 
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